ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

might happen that we should afford a remedy here whfcd is denied
to persons in that jurisdiction, and which would not be allowed to
persons seeking to enforce a similar right under our own laws.
It is hardly necessary to add, that if the defendants are not a corporation, but are a partnership, the plaintiff has a plain and adequate remedy at law.
The defendants' counsel has argued at great length, and with
signal ability, that the liability created by the statutes of Ohio,
being entirely unknown to the common law, no action either at
law or in equity can be maintained in this state on account of or
to enforce that liability. But in the view we have taken of this
case we have not found it necessary to consider that .question
except incidentally. Several other questions raised by the demurrer
we have also had no occasion to consider.
CUSHING, C. J., and LADD, J., concurred.

Demurrer sustained.
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AMENDMENT.

Bil to enforce. Implied

'Tst-Avermentof express promise to per-

form Trust not a new Cause of Action-l7ust resulting from Pay/ment

of Purchase-money.-A bill in chancery was brought for the purpose
of enforcing a trust in regard to certain land, and alleged an express
trust. It was proposed to amend the bill by inserting allegations of
facts from which a trust resulted. It was objected that the resulting
trust was displaced by the express trust, and that the amendment would
introduce a new cause of action.

HNd, that it was no objection to the

implied trust that it was alleged that the defendant had expressly pronised to perform it, and that the object of the bill as amended being to
Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions.
The cases will probably appear in I or 2 Otto.
2 From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 16 Kansas Reports.
8 From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter, and Henry A. Chancy, Esq. Cases decided at April Term 1876.
indicated.

The volume in which they will appear cannot yet be

From J. Mf. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 56 New Hampshire Reports.
5 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 79 Penna. St. Reports.
VOL. XXIV.-78
4

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

enforce substantially the same trust, the amendment did not introduce
a new cause of action : Iall v. Congdron, 56 N. H.
It being alleged that the money with which the land was purchased
was the plaintiff's money, ffebl, that it was no objection to the implied
tru~.t that the defendant furnished the money by way of loan, and that
the plaintiff had agreed that he should hold the land by way of security
-until the money had been repaid: Id.
ASSIGNMENT.

Dihd dl on whlole Llaim- -ot on Balance-Assignee is Tustee for
all Creditors whether se-trcd or iot.-Smeid assigned for the benefit of
creditors his real estate, being subject to three judgments to Graeff; who
sold it under the judgments; the proceeds were brought into court and
decreed to be paid to Graeff; twojudgments were paid in full and the third
in part. In the distribution of the personal estate in the hands of the
assignees. the court below decreed a dividend on the whole of the mpaid judgment only. Ied to be error: the dividend should be on the
whole amount of all the judgmcnts until he should 1;e paid in full, if a
1ro rata dividend would reach that: Graff's A4,]eal ; Meilg's z1Jpeal,
79 Pentna.
Upon an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the property of the
assignor is in trust for the benefit of all his creditors, without regard to
the nature of the securities they hold ; the creditors are the equitable
owners : hM.
(iracff's interest was the extent of his wholeh
claim ; the payment in
full of one judgment, nor the filet that real estate was first resorted to,
did not change his position : d.
]AILMENT.

For what

l /hect Paiilee is re.sponsible-Evidence on question of NegBenik rJS'oilsdble,fr Act of Cashhir.-Collateraltacts
incapable of affording reasonable presumption as to the principal matter
in dispute. arc inadmissible as evidence, as tending to draw the minds
of the jury from the issue and to prejudice and mislead thein: First
Natio(il Bonk of C'rlislc v. Graham. 79 Penna.
Where a bailent is for the sole benefit of the bilor the hailee is
answerable
Ibr gross neglect; when solely for the benefit of the
bailee,
is only
rcsponsiblc
Zefor slight neglect; when reciprocally beneficial
to
both, the bailee is responsible for ordinary neglct: Id.
A bailee keeping the property of the bailor with the ordinary care
with which lie keeps his own, does not fulfil his duty, if the contract
requires strict diligence and extraordinary care : Id.
Where the benefits are reciprocal, the bailee is liable for neglect of
ordinary care, although lie has been careless and reckless in the management of his own goods as well as those of the bailor : Md.
That the bailee has dealt with his own goods and the bailor's in the
same way, is evidence in adjusting the standard of duty and deciding
the question of perfbrmance, and as a test of the bailee's good faith. It
would raise a presumption of adequate diligence : d.
The measure of the bailee's responsibility is to be determined in each
Uy9
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case by a comparison with the conduct of classes of men, not of individuals : i.
The were voluntary act of the cashier of a bank in receiving securitiesfor safe-keeping, will not render the bank liable for their loss; but
if the deposit be known to the directors and acquiesced in, the bank
will be liable: il.
BILLS AND NOTES. See PartnersHp.
Acceptance of Bill of Exchange by Parol-Lex loci contrictits.Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity
of a contract, tire determined by the law of the place where the contract
is made. Matters connected with its performance are' regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting the
remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissibility of evidence, statutes
of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought: ,Scutder v. Union, National Bank, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1875.
Therefore, whether a contract shall be in writing or may be made by
parol, is a formality to be determined by the law of the place where it
is made : Id.
Unless forbidden by statute, it is a rule of law-generally that a promise
to accept an existing bill of exchange is an acceptance thereof whether
the promise be in writing or by parol: Id.
CONTRACT. See Bills.
Government Contract---ower of Secretary of the atvy-Settlement.
-Where the secretary of the navy possesses the power under the legislation of Congress, and the orders of the president, to enter into contracts for work connected with the construction, armament or equipment
of vessels of war, he can suspend the work contracted for, when fromt
any cause the public interest may require its suspension; and where
such suspension is ordered he is authorized to settle with the contractor
upon the compensation to be paid for the partial performance of the
contracts : The United States v. The Corliss Steam-cngine Coniun'y, S.
°
C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
When a settlement in such a case is made upon a full knowledge of
all the facts, without conceahnent, misrepresentation or fraud, it is
equally binding upon the government as upon the contractor: Id.
CORPORATION.

Union, Pacific Railroad-Relationswith United States.-TheF Union
Pacific Railroad Company conceding the right of the government to
retain one.haf of the compensation due it for the transportation of the
mails, military and Indian supplies, and to apply the same to reimburse
the government for interest paid by it on bonds issued to the corporation
to aid in the construction of its railroad and telegraph lines, brought
suit to establish its right to the other moiety. The United States, on
the other hand, having paid interest on these bonds in excess of the
sums credited to the company for services rendered by it, insisted upon
its right to withhold payment altogether. Jeld, that the Act of Congress of 1862, incorporating the Union Paci6c Railroad Company, and
the purposes contemplated by it, show that Congress never intended to
impose on the corporation the obligation to pay current interest ; and
that therefore the deduction for interest paid on the bonds could not be
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lawfully made: The United States v. The Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Contractsmade by Promoters before Charter- Corporation liable, if
benefits accepted and enjoyet-Minority of Promoters cannot bind "the
others.-Where a number of persons not incorporated but associated for
a common object, intending to procure a charter, authorize acts to be
done in furtherance of their object by one of their number, with the
understanding that he should be compensated ; if such acts were necessary to the organization and its objects and are accepted by the
corporation and the benefits enjoyed, they must be taken cure onere and
be compensated for : Bell's Gaq Railroad Co. v. Christy, 79 l'enna.
In such case the promoters of the enterprise must be a majority of
them. A minority could not bind the association or corporation : 1d.
COURT.
Disagreement of Judges as to Reasons.for .Athgment -'here a ma.jority of the court agree in the judgment that ought to be rendered
but disagree as to the reason for such judgment. such judgment must
be entered ; but it is useless to give the opinion of the several judges,
for thereby no point of- law is settled or decided (Foltz v. Merrill, 11
Kans. 479) : Railroad Co. v. Hzubbard, 16 Kans.
DELIVERY.

DIVIDEND.

See Sale.

See Assignment.

DIVORCE.

Extreme Cruelty- Competency of Children as Witnesses .- Upon the
trial of a libel for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, only two
assaults upon the libellant by the libellee were proved, and those of not
a very aggravated nature. It was in proof that the libellee used very
violent language towards the libellant, cursing her, and applying indecent epithets, and conducting himself so as to terrify his wife and
children, and make living with him intolerable. Hel, that these ficts
furnished evidence from which the judge who heard the cause was authorized to find that the charge was supported : Day v. D,., 56 N. H.
Upon such trial, a boy ten years old was offered as a witness. ie
appeared to have no knowledge of the nature ot an oath. Having been
first instructed by the court upon that point, he was permitted to testify.
Iehl, that he was properly admitted : d.
I" a child under the age of nine years is found, after examination by
the court, to possess a sufficient sense of the wickedness and danger of
false swearing, he may be sworn, and admitted to testify : Id.
EVI)E.,cE. See Dirorce; Libel; Xegligence.
Opinions of Non-professional l'itnesses-Isoai.t-y- Prtctice- ight
to Open and Close.-Non-probssional witnesses, who are not subscribing witnesses to a will, may testify to their opinions in regard to the
sanity of the testator, when founded upon their knowledge and observation of the. testator's appearance and conduct : Boardinan v. lVJodman,
47 N II. 120 ; State v. Pihe. 49 N. II. 399. and State v. Archer, 54
N. 1I.468, upon this point, overruled : hIard? v. Merrill, 56 N. If.
The party who affirms that. a will was duly and legally executed, has
the burden of proof; and the accompanying duty of opening, and the
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right to close, no matter in what form the issues for trial may be drawn:
1,1.
INTEREST.
tsurj-Powers of the .National Government.-The National Bank
Act of Congress of the 3d of June 1864, inter alia, makes the following
provisions: (1.) The rate of interest chargeable by each bank is to be
that allowed by the law of the state or territory where the bank is situated. (2.) When by the laws of the state or territory a different rate is
limited for banks of issue organized under the local laws, the rate so
limited is allowed for the national banks. (3.) Wherp no rate of interest is fixed by the laws of the state or territory the national banks may
charge at a rate not exceeding seven per cent. per annum. (4.)
Knowingly reserving, receiving or charging "a rate of interest greater
than aforesaid shall be held and adjudged a forfeiture of the interest which the note, bill or other evidence of debt carries with it, or
which has been agreed to be paid thereon." Held, that the phrase "a
rate of interest greater than aforesaid" has reference not merely to the
preceding entence, which relates to banks where no rate of interest is
fixed by law, but to all the foregoing clauses; and that therefore the
consequences of usury where such rate is fixed, is not to be governed
wholly by the local law upon the subject: National Bunk v. Dearing,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
The states can exercise no control over the national banks nor in any
wise affect their operation except in so far as Congress may see proper
to permit: Id.
In the United States ithe powers of government may be divided into
four classes: those which belong exclusively to the states ; those wlelich
belong exclusively to the national government; those which may be
exercised concurrently and independently by both; and those which
may be exercised by the states, but only with the consent, express or
implied, of Congress : Id.
JUDGMENT.
See Court.
LiBEL.

Action for Libel-Pleading-Evidence.-On the trial of an action
for libel, it appeared that the original writing, the publication of which
was the foundation of the suit, was among the records of the navy
department at Washington.
field, that secondary evidence, of its
existence and contents was properly admitted: Carpenter v. Bailey,
56 N. 11.
The alleged libel contained charges against the plaintiff as paymaster
in the naval service of the United States stationed at Portsmouth, and
requested his removal. HTeld, that a letter from Vice-admiral Porter,
while in charge of the department, to the plaintiff, making the removal,
and stating the reasons for it, was admissible, as an act of the department : Id.
The plaintiff was permitted to testify that he sold his furniture at a
loss, upon his transfer from the naval station at Portsmouth. Held, no
cause for setting aside the verdict in his favor : Id.
The allegations of a special plea of justification in such case must be
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proved substantially as laid. Hence, where such plea set up specific
facts, going to show that the charges.were true, and other facts showing
that the occasion was lawful and the end justifiable, and alleged that
such was the fact, 1eld, that the court properly refused to charge the
jury that if the alleged charges are true the plaintiff cannot recover;
also, that the jury were properly instructed, among other things, that,
if the occasion was lawful
Id. and the alleged libel true, the. verdict should
be for the defendant:
Whether an alleged libel is a privileged communication, is a question
for the jury under proper instructions from the court: Rd.
See Bailment; Interest.
NATIONAL BANKS.
Taxation of by 8tates.-The provision of the Act of Congress of Feb.
ruary 10th 1868, that taxation on national bank stock shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the states,
relates only to the rate, and does not prohibit the states from exempting
any sidjects from taxation. Per Graham, P. J. ; adopted by the Sue
preme Court: Gorgas's Appeal, 79 Penna.
,tock of N'ational Banhs liable to Sctool-ta.c in addition to Statetax.-A school tax was assessed on national bank stock in 1870, which
was unpaid. On the 19th of January 1871, the bank paid the state
tax of one per cent., being the tax ot 1871, under Act of April 12th
1867, sect. 5. fleld, that the holder of stock was not exempt from the
school tax of 1870 : Carlisle School District v. Hepbirn, 79 l'enna.
The state assessor assessed the stock at $150, the par value being
$100, the return was duly made and there was no appeal. JIedd, that
a tax imposed by the school directors on that valuation was not void ;
if the assessment was wrong the remedy was by appeal to the auditorgeneral uuder the Act of April 2d 1868 : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Bailment.

Esrape of Firefrom Locomotive- CircnmstaatialEvidence-Remote
Iyj9ry-Qaestions of fitet for Jiny.-Negligence on the part of a railroad conpany in permitting fire to escape from its engines may be shown
wholly by circumstantial evidence, and it is not necessary in such a case
act of negligence should be introthat any direct proof of any particular
16 Kans.
duced: Railroad Co. v. Bales,
Where eircunstantial evidence, tending to show negligence on the
part of a railroad company in permitting fire to csciape from its engines,
is introduced by the plaintiff, and the defendant company afterwards
introduces direct and positive evidence tending to show the contrary;
I1eld, that it is a question for the jury to determine which evidence is
entitled to the greatest credit: ITd.
Where fire, which is negligently permitted to escape from an engine
of a railroad company. does not thil upon the plaintiff's property, but
falls upon the property of another, setting it on fire, and then spreads
by means of dry grass, stubble and other combustible materials, and
passes over the lands of several different persons before it reaches the
property of the plaintiff, and finally reaching the property of the plaintiff, at a great distance fiom where the fire was first kindled, sets it on
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fire and consumes it: Held, that the negligence of a railroad company,
in such a case, is not too remote from the injury to the plaintiff's property to constitute the basis of a cause of action against the company :
Id
The proper questions to be considered in such a case are as follows :
(1.) Was the railroad company negligent in permitting tile fire to
escape? (2.) Would the plaintiff's property have been destroyed by
fire as it was destroyed, except fur the fire permitted to escape from the
company's engine ? (.3.) Could the railroad company, by exercise of
reasonable diligence, at or before the time of permitting said fire to
escape, have anticipated the burning of the plaintiff's property as likely
to occur and as the natural and probable consequence of permitting said
fire to escape? And these are all questions of fact entirely for the jury
to consider and determine under proper instructions from the court:
Id.o
Speed of Steam-cars in Cty-May be regulated by Ordinance- Contributory Negligence by (7ild-And Parents.-A child about nine years
old was sent by his mother, who resided in Harrisburg, near defendants'
railroad, on an errand across the road; whilst on the track he was killed
by an engine going westward; there were iron-works and houses for the
hands on the opposite side of the road at that point, which was in the
outskirts of the city ; and the hands of the works and other persons
were frequently crossing the track about the place. East of where the
boy was struck was a curve, which prevented the engineer from seeing
him till within too short a distance to stop the train after lie was seen.
There was no ordinance of the city limiting the rate of running trains
at that point. There was evidence that the train was running at a high
rate of speed. Held, that whether the train was running at a rate of
speed which was safe and prudent under the circumstances, was for the
jury : Pefinsylvania Railroad Company v. *Lewiset uex., 79 Penna.
It is not common prudence or ordinary care for trains to enter the
outskirts of a city at a dangerous rate of speed, although the people have
no right to go on the railroad track: Id.
Although persons on a railroad track are' trespassers, regard must be
had to the habits, character, condition and circumstances of a people
living in a city and immediately on the line of a railroad : Id.
The Commonwealth by its police power may regulate positive rights
when for the safety, protection and welfare of the people; and the speed
of trains through towns and cities may be regulated by ordinance :. Id.
When it is determined by the jury on the facts -submitted to them
that the rate of speed of a train-is incompatible with public safety under
the circumstances of the place, the rights of a company even on its own
track are qualified by the law of the public good : Id.
The court charged :-" If the boy (being on the track) had sufficient
judgment and discretion to know his danger, and did not exercise the
ordinary care that one.of his age and maturity should, he -was guilty of
such negligence as would prevent him from recovering," &c. field not
to be error : Id.
There was evidence in this case of contributory negligence by the
parents as to exposing their son to danger, and submitted with proper
instructions : Id.
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PARTNERSIP.

Right of liddatig Partnerto giee Firm-notes.-A firm dissolved in
MIay. givig notice by publication and authorizing one as the liquidating
partner to use the firm namo for that purpose i in August, without the
knowledge of his fellows, he drew notes payable to the firm, endorsed
them with the firm name, had them discounted by bankers with whom
the firm had never had dealings; the proceeds of the notes passed to
the individual credit of the partner making them ; there was evidence
that the proceeds were applied to the firm debts. Ield, that if the
notes were bondtfide for liquidation and the proceeds applied to payment
of firm debts, the other partners would be liable: Lloyd et al. v. Thomas
et al., 79 ]enna.
RAILROAD.
See A\'gligence.
SALE.
Tlhu ()entract Completc-Dclhery 9ost Signficant -Tct, but nzot
Condclusie.-The plaintiff sold defendant certain logs lying in Bad
River, and received $50 on account of the price. He (plaintiff) was
subsequently to run the logs down stream as far as the limits of the Bad
River Booming Company, where they were to be measured. The price
was to be S per 'K. The logs were delivered to the Booming Company,
but defendant never received them : .eld. That where under a contract
for sale of personalty something remains to be done, as to identify the
property, or to fix the price to be paid, &e., the presumption is that title
is not to pass until such act has been accomplished, but such presumption is not conclusive. The question is one of mutual assent, whether
the minds of the parties have met, and by their understanding the purchaser has now become owner: 1ilkinson v. lfoliday, S. 0. Mich., April
Term 1876.
Delivery is the most significant fact to prove transfer of title, but it
is not conclusive; parties may agree that title shall not pass until the
measurement be made to determine the amount of the price to be paid: Id.
As to the delivery in this case, the real question was, for whom was
the Booming company bailee after they received the logs? And
while the fact that the defendant was to pay the company's charges
raised the presumption that the logs were held for him, on the other
hand, the fact that the logs were to be scaled, to determine how muci
was to be paid, and no credit having been agreed on, raised the inference
that payment was to be made before the purchaser was to be at liberty
to renmove the logs: I.
The question of delivery was one of fact to be submitted to the jury,
and not to be decided for them by the court: d.
TnuST.

See Arnendmeut.
WAY.

Way of Necessity-Inplied Reservaton.-A party having conveyed
a portion of his land over which was the only means of access to the
renaining land- Th'l, that a right of way by necessity to the remaining
land was reserved: Pingreev. XcDuffie, 56 N. II.
WILL.

See E'idence.

